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Abstract
This paper describes the security mechanisms of several wireless build-
ing automation technologies, namely ZigBee, EnOcean, ZWave, KNX,
FS20, and HomeMatic. It is shown that none of the technologies provides
the necessary measure of security that should be expected in building
automation systems. One of the conclusions drawn is that software em-
bedded in systems that are build for a lifetime of twenty years or more
needs to be updatable.
Keywords: security, building automation, ZigBee, EnOcean, ZWave, KNX,
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1 Introduction
Building automation systems (BAS) implement a message-based communication
network to initiate actor activities (like temperature regulation or switching off
the lights) as a result of some sensor information and simple rule matching. We
will avoid to write about smart home because we think that there is not much
smartness in a (usually static) rule like “If temperature is below threshold, open
valve”.
Why security is relevant in BAS becomes obvious when a hotel guest gains
control over lights and blinds in other guests rooms [SD-Agencies, 2014] or when
a smart door lock allows any visitor to come in [Eikenberg, 2015]. Tests per-
formed at the Technical University of Wien have shown that thousands of BAS
are accessible over the Internet [Praus and Kastner, 2014].
In this paper we look at several wireless technologies that are typically used
to upgrade an existing installation with some automation features. In this sce-
nario it is common to deploy wireless systems rather than cable-based networks,
in order to avoid significant (and expensive) construction work inside a building.
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Note that with one exception all investigated technologies claim to be secure,
most of them implementing an AES 128 encryption mechanism.
The paper is structured as follows: After the presentation of related work
in chapter 2, security goals for BAS are briefly summarised in chapter 3, fol-
lowed by encryption methods commonly used in BAS are listed in chapter 4.
Our main contribution is provided in chapter 5, which presents the security
mechanisms of various wireless BAS communication protocols. Some of these
communication protocols are discussed in more detail, with a short analysis of
tapped messages, others are only included for completeness without discussion
if they do implement any security mechanisms. Finally some conclusions are
drawn and plans for our future work are presented.
The paper summarises findings from a thesis written by Bastian van Venrooy
under the supervision of Prof. Karl Jonas at Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University in
2015. The complete thesis is available (in German) [van Venrooy, 2016].
2 Related Work
Security challenges and problems of BAS are more present in mass media and
popular science than in the research community. However, some researchers
have tried to investigate the specific challenges of BAS. In [Brush et al., 2011]
the authors conducted semi-structured home visits to 14 households with home
automation. One of the barriers for home automation they identified was the
difficulty achieving security, leading to the request to provide users with simple
security primitives that they can confidently configure. “Remote access was a
double-edged sword for people. The functionality was appealing, but participants
worried about introducing a security risk.”
A risk analysis on a smart home automation system has been conducted
in [Jacobsson et al., 2016], and it has been shown “that connected devices may
cause undesirable consequences to user privacy with respect to, e.g., access to
potentially sensitive meta-information, and the misuse of user-intense mobile
devices, and the risk of concept drift as novel devices, such as, surveillance
cameras and personal wearables, which are often unplanned for, are dynamically
attached to the smart home automation system.”
In [Denning et al., 2013] the authors seek to survey the security and pri-
vacy landscape for devices in the home. Their article includes an overview of
the structure of attacks to the home ecosystem, differentiating between low-
level mechanisms, intermediate goals and high level goals (such as altering logs,
gathering incriminating data and physical theft). An important aspect is the
possibility to import malicious software into the home network via a mobile
device: “If a device is mobile, then the chances are higher that it will come into
contact with malicious or infected networks or devices.” In their conclusion the
authors state that “We need a strategy for how to secure devices in the home.
We need to understand the potential risks: risks that are a function of a de-
vice’s potential exposure to attack, its attractiveness as an attack target, and the
potential impacts on human assets if the device is compromised.
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[Praus et al., 2016] provides an extensive survey of the security requirements
for distributed control applications and analyses software protection methods. It
includes an overview of security in BAS with a focus on BACnet and KNXnet/IP.
The authors develop a secure control application architecture for BAS “being
adaptable to all common BAS standards (which) needs to cover BAS specific
constraints and be capable of detecting possible attacks.”
The authors in [Armknecht et al., 2016] have identified that “specifications
of security mechanisms often lack explicit descriptions of the envisioned security
goals and the underlying assumptions (which) makes it difficult for developers
and customers to understand the level of security provided by the systems.” They
have developed and provide a formal security model for ZigBee Light Link.
[Harald Glanzer, 2016] discusses the need of BAS for secure communication
and high availability. “For this purpose, the underlying communication sys-
tem has to be robust and reliable against malicious manipulations.” The paper
proposes extensions to KNX for a deployment in critical environments.
The contribution of this paper is an overview and practical investigation of
security mechanisms of several wireless BA technologies.
3 Security goals
Security mechanisms implemented in a BAS can be characterised along the
following security goals [Sikora, 2003]:
Confidentiality: If an offender is able to get hold of transmitted messages, the
content (information) of that message should be hidden from the offender.
The typical approach to achieve this goal is message encryption. While it
seems obvious that it is impossible to prevent message tapping in wireless
systems, it is also very difficult in wired infrastructures. Even if the initial
installation secures all cables and lines inside a private area, the next
public event will make those cable accessible to an intruder.
Integrity: If a message arrives at its final destination, the receiver should be
sure that the content of that message is identical to the original transmis-
sion, without any modifications of that content. A method to implement
integrity is a checksum attached to the message. If the receiver’s calcu-
lation of the checksum is identical to the checksum in the message, the
message has not been altered (assuming that the offender is not able to
calculate a new checksum himself).
Authentication: Identifying the real sender of a message requires an authen-
tication mechanism, like the transmission of a shared secret (password) to
make sure that a received message was not generated by an offender.
Availability: Information is available when and where it is needed. Unautho-
rised persons do not have access to the information and they are not able
to prevent availability for authorised persons.
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These requirements result immediately into scenarios for an attack: In par-
ticular in a wireless communication environment it is very easy for an offender
to tap messages that are transmitted over the air. While some technical ap-
proaches exist to prevent this (such as limiting transmission power, preventing
access to premises), in a typical scenario it should be expected that messages
are accessible. Of course this is also the case for large wired infrastructures such
as public or commercial buildings, or hotels, where many people can gain access
to the physical cabling.
Message transmissions from unauthorised sources can interfere with regular
operation of the BAS in various ways. Almost unpreventable, but typically easy
to detect, is an interfering signal that prevents regular messages to be received
by the BAS. More likely are replay attacks of tapped messages and specifically
generated new messages from unauthorised sources when encryption keys have
been disclosed. The impact of these attacks depend on the capabilities of the
receivers to identify unauthorised messages, enabling them to simply ignore
them.
Finally, physical access to the components of a BAS enable an offender to
access or manipulate the memory or the configuration of a system. Depending
on the system architecture this may result in the failure of a simple device or
disclose the security mechanisms of the whole network.
4 Encryption methods
Most of the technologies described in the next chapter use the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) to encrypt data. AES is a symmetric encryption technique
that requires knowledge of the same key on both ends of the communication.
It comes with different key-lengths and different modes. 128 Bits and 256 Bits
are typical key-lengths and considered “secure” [Barker, 2016].
A block cypher splits a message into message blocks and encrypts each block
individually before transmission. Stream cypher encrypt a message bit-by-bit,
without message splitting. If the same plain-text is encrypted with the same
encryption key, the same cypher-text is created. This can be avoided if variable
parts are attached to every message. Thus, AES supports various encryption
modes and different BAS technologies may support different modes:
AES-128 ECB Electronic Codebook : This is the simplest and fastest AES
mode. Identical plain-text leads to identical cypher-text. This is the main
disadvantage of that mode, making it prone to some forms of security
attacks. This is not directly related to the actual encryption method
(AES in this case). ECB mode encryption should generally be avoided.
AES-128 CBC Cipher Block Chaining : This mode modifies the plain-text
blocks prior to encryption. An arbitrary initialisation vector (IV) is
XORed with the first block, and the cypher-text of the first block is used
as the IV of the second block and so on. This use of different IVs with
every block results in different cypher-text for identical plain-text.
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AES-128 CBC-MAC CBC-Message Authentication Code: Uses the
CBC-MAC concept to authenticate (sign) a message. The last block of a
message is CBC-encrypted and attached to the message.
AES-128 CTR Counter : CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher. An
initialisation vector includes a counter and a random number. Flipping a
bit in the cipher-text produces a flipped bit in the plain-text at the same
location. This property allows many error correcting codes to function
normally even when applied before encryption.
AES-128 CCM Counter with CBC-MAC : Provides encryption and au-
thentication with a combination of Counter and CBC-MAC.
There is a trade-off between the level of security and the effort and cost
to provide it. We want to ensure that an offender cannot take control over
a BAS. If an offender gets access to a component of a BAS, she will be able
to compromise or deactivate that component, possibly even to read a secure
information out of the devices memory. We silently assume that this kind of
security threads exist for all systems and we will not elaborate on them in the
remaining of this article. However, they should only affect the information from
the local device and not compromise the BAS as a whole.
5 Wireless BA technologies
5.1 ZigBee
ZigBee was introduced in 2004. Three versions exist: ZigBee2004, ZigBee2006
and ZigBee2007 which is equal to ZigBee Pro. Current products do not support
the 2004 version anymore, making older and new ZigBee equipment incompati-
ble. Updating a product to a newer and possibly more secure version of ZigBee
is usually not supported. The standard is publicly available on the website of
the ZigBee alliance. It takes advantage of the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer for
wireless transmission in a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN).
For ZigBee2007 two security levels are specified, High Security (also called
Commercial Security) and Standard Security (also called Residential Security).
Figure 1: ZigBee packet captured by the sniffer
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The major difference between the two levels lays in the methods for key dis-
tribution and management [Vidgren et al., 2013] High Security level has higher
hardware requirements (such as more memory for more encryption keys) and
results in more expensive (industrial) products. Most consumer products im-
plement Standard Security, including the systems that we investigated. More
specific, we used Philips Hue products (a bridge and a Philips Hue bloom) that
implement ZigBee Light Link. This protocol is a simplified version of ZigBee
that only supports a subset of possible components. The hardware under test
was a Philips Hue bridge (model BSB001 with FreeRTOS 6.0.5) and a Philips
Hue bloom (model 7299761PH). Like many vendors, Philips provides a smart-
phone app that can only be used if the products are connected to the public
Internet.
The basic key management functionality relies on a pre-defined master-key
that is used to encrypt an initial key-exchange between components in a ZigBee
Light Link infrastructure. In order to connect the light to the bridge, the bridge
needs to know the serial number of the light that is printed on a sticker of the
light’s power-supply.
We tapped the ZigBee traffic with a USB stick that uses a Texas Instru-
ments CC2531 chip. The Ubiqua Protocol Analyzer software simplifies message
interpretation. The light was switched on via the meethue website.
The tapped packet in figure 1 was transmitted between the bridge and the
light. Figure 2 shows the meaning of the packet. The first nine bytes are MAC
header, including source and destination address, the destination PAN ID, a se-
quence number and control bytes. The MAC payload covers 94 bytes and starts
with the NWK header information, again including a source and destination
address. The protocol analyser shows that the payload is encrypted. A Mes-
sage Integrity Code (MIC) ensures integrity of the NWK data. We transmitted
several identical messages (Switch lights on) and could see that the transmitted
cyper-text was different in each message. It was not possible for us to identify
a pattern in the encrypted part of the messages. The ZigBee-based communi-
cations between the Hue bridge and the light appears to be secure.
ZigBee makes use of three types of encryption keys: A master-key is used
for initial key-exchange when a new component enters the network. It allows an
encrypted transmission of local keys that are used for all further communication.
The master-key is pre-set by the equipment vendor. Link-keys are used for
individual encryption between any two components in the ZigBee network. If
an attacker can get hold of the link-key of two components A and B, it will not
be able to decrypt the communication between B and C. Standard security does
not support link-keys.
Finally, the network-key is a single key used by all components in the network
to encrypt ZigBee traffic of that network. Getting access to the network key
allows an attacker to decrypt all traffic in that network. The controller provides
this network key to new components during their initial network join. The
master-key is used to secure this transmission. In our case this is the ZigBee
Light Link master-key that Philips has pre-configured in every component.
6
Figure 2: Content of the ZigBee packet
[Durech and Franekova, 2014]
and [ZigBee, 2010] describe Zig-
Bee security threads, e.g. re-
play attacks because an imple-
mentation does not verify the
frame sequence number. Dhan-
jani shows how the system can be
attacked via its Internet connec-
tion [Dhanjani, 2013], describing
malware that can cause perpet-
ual blackout. The ZigBee Light
Link master key was leaked in
2015 on Twitter by user MayaZig-
Bee [qznc bot, 2015], compromis-
ing the whole security concept.
Since any component can request
to join the network anytime (in-
secure join), an intruder can eas-
ily get access to the network key.
Standard mode does not allow to
change this behaviour. ZigBee se-
curity is based on secure mech-
anisms, but the master-key con-
cept, insecure join, the standard
and the implementations result in
an insecure BAS.
5.2 EnOcean
EnOcean was specified as an international standard ISO/IEC 14543-3-10 in 2012
[ISO, 2012]. Its focus includes low-energy BAS, enabling devices to perform
energy harvesting: pushing the button of a switch produces enough energy to
transmit the signal. Solar cells or differences in temperature are other methods
supported by EnOcean hardware. The energy concepts limit the communication
and encryption capabilities of the systems.
EnOcean differentiates between an insecure and a secure mode. Secure mode
allows a combination of encryption, authentication and rolling code. The initial
distribution of the encryption key can be encrypted (if a shared pre-defined key
exists) or unencrypted. Encryption is based on AES and includes AES-CBC,
details of the variants deployed by EnOcean can be found in [EnOcean, 2013].
In order to activate pairing and negotiation, it is required to push a physical
button at the enOcean base station.
We used the ESK300 Starter Kit for our experiments, more specifically the
USB300DB gateway and a PTM215 switch. Dolphin View software (Advanced
Version 3.6.0.0) enabled message analysis. Pushing and releasing button A0
results in two unencrypted messages as depicted in figure 3.
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Byte Description HexVal Meaning
1 sync byte 55
2,3 length data 00 07 7
4 length optional data 07 7
5 packet type 01 radio msg
6 checksum 7A
7 RORG F6 repeated switch comm.
8 payload 20 release
9,10,11,12 sender ID FF FE E1 E5
13 status 30 0011 0000
14 msg part 02
15,16,17,18 receiver ID FF FF FF FF broadcast
19 receive strength 34 -52 dBm
20 payload 00
21 checksum C9
Table 1: Meaning of the EnOcean packet
The meaning of the message content of the lower-line message is summarised
in table 1.
The initial key exchange for secure mode operation can be encrypted (if
a pre-shared secret exists) or unencrypted. Initialising the process requires
physical access to the controller (push-button). Dolphin View supports various
security parameters such as the length of the rolling code (24 or 32 bits).
The tapped message in figure 4 was the result of pushing the A1 button of the
switch. It uses 24-bit CMAC and VXOR AES encryption, and a 16-bit rolling
code. The first line is the packet header with sync-byte, packet-size and packet
type. The second line starts with REORG set to 0x30 which means that this
is a secure message, followed by four bytes of encrypted message content. The
remaining bytes are the packet trailer, including sender and receiver addresses.
First and last line are very similar to the corresponding unencrypted message.
Figure 4: Encrypted EnOcean message
The initial distribution of the en-
cryption key is based on a pre-shared
master key or unencrypted. The key
is identical for all components served
by a single base station. Since key-
exchange requires physical access to
the gateway, it is difficult for an in-
truder to initiate this key exchange
Figure 3: EnOcean packet captured by the sniffer
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in order to get access to the encryption key in the network. After this initial
distribution of the encryption key, enOcean is a rather secure BAS, support-
ing encryption, authentication and integrity. It seems that enOcean encryption
provides integrity, authentication and prevention against replay. Unfortunately,
in CBC mode EnOcean uses the same IV for all messages.
Experiments with a second enOcean component revealed another problem.
A window handle uses enOcean to inform the base station about its current
status (open or closed). While the messages themselves were encrypted, OPEN
and CLOSED messages were of different length. So while it was not possible to
decypt the message itself, it was easy to determine the status from the message
length.
5.3 Z-Wave
The proprietary protocol was developed by Sigma Designs and licensed to many
BAS vendors. The specification is confidential and business partners have to
sign a Non-Disclosure-Agreement before they can implement the protocol. In
order to ensure interoperability, all products require certification by the Z-Wave
Alliance. A product that provides encryption may use the Z-Wave Plus Logo,
so it can be assumed that only those components support security mechanisms.
Parts of the protocol have been re-engineered, some confidential specifica-
tions are available on the Internet. OpenZwave [OpenZwave, 2016a]
[OpenZwave, 2016b] provides an open source implementation that supports
“most switches, dimmers, thermostats, energy monitors, motion sensors, appli-
ance modules, key fobs, door/window sensors” including security related devices
such as locks.
For our experiments we used the MT2600 Home Control Central Unit and
a MT02646 Metering Plug from Devolo. Installation of the controller requires
Internet connectivity and an account on the Devolo website. During the manda-
tory registration process, private user data has to be provided to Devolo in order
to gain access to the controller. In order to include a new component in the
home network, the controller needs to be brought in peering mode via the Inter-
net connection. While the specification of the metering plug states that the plug
supports 128 Bit AES encryption, the webinterface does not provide any related
information and does not offer a method to enable or disable these settings.
We used third-party components for unencrypted communication to the
plug. FHEM open source software running on a Raspberry Pi used a USB
stick from Z-Wave.Me to send unencrypted messages to the plug. The plug
reacted immediately and could be switched with messages 00 13 0303 25 01
FF 25 03 (ON) and 00 13 0303 25 01 00 25 03 (OFF).
If secure mode is used, a network-wide encryption key Kn is used to create
a message key and an authentication key:
Kc = AES − ECBKn(Wordc)
Km = AES − ECBKn(Wordm)
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These two keys are used to encrypt and authenticate messages in secure
mode. Wordc and Wordm are stored in the firmware of the Z-Wave compo-
nents. The message authentication code (MAC) which is used to authenticate
the message includes a random number (nonce) to prevent message replay.
The network key is provided by the controller and encrypted with a master-
key. Z-Wave components that received the network key and used it to generate
packet- and authentication keys should only use these keys for a secure commu-
nication. In their security evaluation [Fouladi and Ghanoun, 2013] the authors
took advantage of the fact that the master-key is stored in the Z-Wave hard-
ware and has been revealed. An attacker can generate a valid new network key
and send it to a component. The authors describe a security attack against a
key-lock where the lock could be convinced to accept this new network key. The
attacker was then able to control the lock. Since it was not possible to update
the lock software, all locks needed to be replaced.
The example shows two important aspects of security in BAS:
1. Closed source prevents early detection of security problems. Many prod-
ucts may be installed before the problem becomes obvious. (However,
various security problems in open source ssh implementations show that
open source does not provide any security guarantees either)
2. Implementation of software update mechanisms should be mandatory in
order to prevent the necessity of physical replacement of components with
a compromised security concept.
5.4 KNX
While KNX has its main market share as a wired bus-based BAS, its RF-
version supports wireless command and control. The standard failed to develop
any security mechanisms for many years and has just recently released initial
security mechanisms based on AES. Since vendors have not started to implement
them, to the knowledge of the authors all KNX sensors and actors use insecure
communication and can be easily controlled by an offender. Not to mention that
also KNX components do not support an update of the security mechanisms.
Since KNX is the market leading BA technology in large commercial and
public buildings, including critical infrastructure such as hospitals, its ignorance
towards security mechanisms appears to be particularly problematic. In addi-
tion, KNX component cost is at the upper end of the line, where the additional
cost for a secure implementation should be easier to compensate.
Many examples for security attacks against KNX exist and we will only
mention the one in Shenzhen because it is interesting how the KNX association
reacted to it: “Jesus Molina, who was staying at the St. Regis Shenzhen hotel,
found that he could easily take control of the thermostats, lights, TVs and window
blinds in all of the hotel’s 250-plus rooms, as well as alter the electronic “Do
Not Disturb” lights outside each door—all from the comfort of his luxurious bed”
[Zetter, 2014].
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The official reply from KNX focused on the request that “it is essential
that separate Wi-Fi networks are used for these purposes, one for public access
of which the key can be known and one for communication between the digital
butler and the hotel room, with a key that is not revealed. In latter case, the
researcher would first have had to hack his way into the Wi-Fi, before he could
have achieved anything via KNX IP”. The association states that “The cradle of
the KNX system lies as far back as the nineties, where security issues were not
such a hot topic as they are today”, leaving the security burden to the network
administrator (who probably does not have an idea about how KNX works)
[KNX Association, 2014] .
Our own experiments included a simple replay attack against a roller shutter
whose vendor promotes the shutter with the additional security it provides. It
took a student only a few minutes to control the shutter, using a laptop and a
low-cost USB transceiver.
5.5 HomeMatic
This system developed by eq-3 is one of the dominating BAS for private houses
in Germany. It followed the earlier FS20 system that is especially popular in
budget-priced wireless BAS like simple sockets and did not implement any kind
of security. Some of the systems support AES encryption and are equipped with
a system default key that is identical in all HM components. The default key is
publicly available on the Internet.
For a long time eq-3 discouraged users to change the default system key.
In the meantime (since 2014), since the security problems became public to a
wider audience, eq-3 changed its mind and requests users to change the system
key [HomeMatic Inside, 2014].
We used a HM CCU2 as a central controller and a wireless plug socket HM-
ES-PMSw1-Pl for our experiments. The BidCoS Bidirectional Communication
Standard is the proprietary protocol developed and used by eq-3. It has not
been made public, but most features have been reverse-engineered by open-
source projects such as FHEM [FHEM, 2016].
Figure 5: HomeMatic Message
Figure 5 shows a message from the controller to the socket. Its interpretation
is provided in table 2.
We used a CUL to replicate the message. While the plug indicates that it
has received a message with a wrong counter, it switches state according to the
replayed packet. Since the plug sends regular status information (approx. every
three minutes), sender and receiver ID can be considered public.
Changing connection mode from standard to secure puts the communication
between the controller and the plug into secure mode. Tapping HM messages
reveals that even in secure mode messages are not encrypted. In fact, while HM
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Byte Description HexVal Meaning
1 command A AskSin
2 length 0E 14
3 counter 2A 42
4 flag A0 160
5 type 11 17
6,7,8 sender F11034 Sender ID
9,10,11 receiver 2C0EA8 Receiver ID
14,13,14 payload 0201C8 ON
Table 2: Meaning of the HomeMatic packet
markets its products as secure with AES support, all messages are transmit-
ted as plain text. Secure mode is implemented as a simple challenge-response
procedure where the AES key is used to authenticate the sender of a message.
Figure 6: HomeMatic Challenge-Response sequence
The first message in figure 6 contains the controller’s request 0x0201C8 to
switch on the plug socket. The socket replies with an AES-encrypted challenge
0x044F1E66D0C65B00 that needs to be solved by the controller in order to
verify that the controller is entitled to send requests. The controller responses
to the challenge and finally the socket confirms that it will switch on.
So while message content is not encrypted by secure mode, the challenge-
response prevents unauthorised commands to be accepted by the plug.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
None of the studied home automation technologies can be considered secure.
The ZigBee Light Link experience teaches that a “secret” master key is not a
good idea. The KNX approach to move the burden of security “out of scope”
cannot be a solution. HomeMatic ignores any privacy issues and implementation
specific problems can make any security architecture fail.
As we have learned from many areas, security is not a static feature, but
develops over time. It becomes obvious that it is a major problem when existing
systems cannot be updated after the security mechanisms have been compro-
mised. And compatibility requires that even new devices implement compro-
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mised mechanisms. Another aspect is that implementation of security mecha-
nisms should be open-source. Obfuscation is not a concept to make software
safe and secure.
Future work follows two directions: We want to find a good concept to up-
date firmware, even in very small devices of a BAS, such as a light switch. Open
Mobile Alliance Device Management and Eclipse IoT seem to be frameworks to
start with. This will also allow an adaptation of the communication protocols to
changing user needs, such as switching from one protocol to another, provided
that the physical requirements (such as frequency and modulation) can be met
by the hardware. But in particular switching between ZigBee, Bluetooth and
6Lowpan is simple, since they all rely on the same underlying protocol. Second,
we need to find key distribution mechanisms that are not prone to the publica-
tion of a single master key. Component specific keys may be an approach that
prevents networks from being compromised if a single component is.
It is assumed that future BAS sensors and actors can rely on more power-
ful micro-controllers than today, making it easier to implement reliability and
security even in very small systems. An open issue is heterogeneity, both in
terms of protocols on all levels and in case of (wired and wireless) transmission
infrastructure.
Finally, technical security goes hand-in-hand with usability. Security mecha-
nisms must be implemented in a way that the user wants to use them, otherwise
he will just ignore or circumvent them.
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